“The central failure of Continental philosophy has been the rejection of naturalism.”
Is this really an accurate characterisation of Continental philosophy?
Aside from ignoring notable instances such as Gaston Bachelard, Rene Thom, Jacques Monod, perhaps even Michel Serres, all of whom have been hugely influential in ‘Continental philosophy’, it is insensitive to philosophy’s obligation to consider all claims, all positions, all traditions, and not to presuppose the privilege of any one of them, just because of a measure of any popular success.
Have not conceptions of Nature varied through the ages?
This variation indexes contingency in what counts as scientific knowledge, at any particular time, sometimes in a quite profound way.
In any statistical distribution, any calculation of an ‘average’ serves commonality and not the ‘outlier’. ‘Nature’ is the residual conceptualisation that emerges from such a sifting of ‘experiences’, the filtering for ‘consistency’: sometimes, the ‘outlier’ phenomenon is host to scientific possibilities radically different to what the ‘received consensus’ claims. And, perhaps, it is this that is of most interest. The insight that jumps to a new understanding, instead of mere combinatorics.
“If you find yourself explaining being in terms of the signifier, text, rhetoric, culture, power, history, or lived experience, then your thought deserves to be committed to flame.”
This is disturbing, it is redolent of other book burning practioners rather than David Hume. Hume’s scepticism emerged out of a genuine philosophic path, rather than the unthinking ‘cult-speaks’ that characterise the epoch of an exploitative ‘modernity’, of which ‘speculative realism’ seems to be the most recent, sub-cultural ‘gang’ argot. A collation of anachronies and out-of-context citations, ‘speculative realism’ attempts to contrive imaginary philosophical contentions by replaying ‘positions’ noone has seriously held for centuries.
I remember telling a physics and philosophy student about a joke I’d written, involving an army of Hume clones rushing around and burning books. He laughed a little too much. It wasn’t really that funny.
“The point is not that these other orientations have failed to make contributions to our understanding of the natural world, but that they have mistakenly treated these things as grounds of the natural world, rather than the reverse.”
If the ‘naturalist’ believes all those ‘orientations’ are rooted in the ‘natural’: if the ‘natural’ is a self-enclosed system of mutual ‘self-referentialitease’: who is to say what is a ‘ground’ or not? What confers the attribute of ‘ground-ness’?
“Your thought is a reaction formation to the narcissistic wound of the fact that your existence is contingent and that you are only the third of the three great apes.”
“great apes”? – “‘You are reckless in your modesty!'” (Sheckley:1966) lol
A thought is a thought, wherever it seems to be hosted, its spatiotemporal qualities (‘materiality’, etc.,) are features to be taken into consideration, not excuses to limit the scope of that thought only according to a particular ‘lowest common denominator’ understanding.
“There’s even a bit of truth in Christ, Paul, and Buddha.”
Can you speak so assuredly on concepts of truth that you are able to dispense portions of it to those traditions which played a large part in their very formation?
“All you need to do is abandon the notion that humans aren’t an animal, that somehow being is dependent on humans and culture, and that somehow we have ends like knowledge and transcendence. All you have to do is re-interpret the entirety of your claims about lived experience, the signifier, culture, power, etc., in naturalistic terms.”
anima, animation? soul?
knowledge, transcendence
These are all open concepts, perspectives whose resolutions according to this or that logic, whether ‘scientific’ or otherwise, are themselves contingent and arbitrary.
‘Naturalistic reinterpretations’ are the easiest thing in the world, all it means is that one reinterprets according to the vocabulary of relatively uncontentious ‘physical presences’: the systems where they seem to have most theoretical consistency, and the ‘lowest common denominator’. The problem is that there is always more than one way to do this, and that everything one rejects as extraneous comes rushing back at ‘deeper levels’ of investigation.
Any search for the ‘ground’ of the manifest, always leads to a non-manifest principle, a theory, a novel principle of form, a substantial configuration derived from the very manifestations it is supposed to account for. So it is a self-referring system. But it is never fully closed. As Derrida says: “Meaning is context-bound, but context is boundless.” This applies to everything, not just ‘language’. Would not Godel have said something similar?
If the Occidental tradition can come up with no more than the disingenuously regurgitated contentions of ‘Speculative Realism’, then it hasn’t moved beyond Derrida and the 60’s. And ‘speculative realism’ is merely a reactionary nostalgia for the comforting ‘finitudes’ of ‘anthropic’ forms of ‘presence’ (‘self’, ‘world’, ‘substantia’, etc.,) in a ‘universe’ that always exceeds the limited comprehension of an exploitative mentality.
Bruno Latour talks about the “institution” of matter, a horrible simplification of the diverse materials put into play in our practices. This leads him to say: “There is no matter at all”. That is to say that materialism is a metaphysical principle, a lowest common denominator, to unify and homogenise the heterogeneous materials deployed by different networks of knowledge and existence. There is no matter in this metaphysical sense because there is no unity of science, and I would emphasise no unity of common sense either. Latour summons us to just start measuring things around us and try to sketch out and colour a drawing of them. He claims that we will soon recognise that we do not live in a unified homogeneous Euclidian space. Any materialism or naturalism would have to be totally empty of content amounting to just a meaningless ritual formula, or it would have to be judged on its consequences for our knowledge both present and future.
As to the historical question of the so-called idealism of continental philosophy, I think that Levi Bryant gives a very misleading picture. Althusser, Rancière, Deleuze, Guattari, Foucault (despite the silly equivocation of Bryant on the notion of “power” as being somehow “anthropocentric”), Michel Serres, Bernard Stiegler are all materialists – though in order to avoid the aporia indicated above I have argued that their ontology is diachronic. Bryant however is proposing yet another synchronic ontology and is apparently incapable of doing justice to such diachronic materialism.
I’ve only returned to philosophical activity in March, after more than a decade and a half. So am not really up on all the developments of the previous fifteen years. Bruno Latour was not a major figure fifteen years ago, though I had heard of him, and Alain Badiou, too. I didn’t hear anything that piqued my interest, at that time. Since returning to philosophy, and discovering this ‘movement’ called ‘Speculative Realism’, the current relevance of both thinkers has imposed itself. I can admit that phrases like ‘actor-network theory’ didn’t really inspire a feeling that anything was going on in his oeuvre beyond some kind of compromised hybrid of sociology, a metaphorics of computor technology, and perhaps a sprinkling of philosophy. Your comment changes that attitude, particularly the quote: ““There is no matter at all””. It reminds me of Derrida’s “There has never been a(ny) perception.”
Your explanation is helpful, it actually responds to my post, and gives me something more to think about. It’s going to take time to really think it through, so a fuller response might emerge in time. For now, I can say, if there are multiplicities, it is always possible to conceive them as a unity, as an additive conglomeration, through conglomerative addition. Whether such a conception has any value beyond spiritual contemplation or astrophysics is another question.Whether such a conception could lead to insidious political totalisations is yet another question. Whether the conception of unity could lead to insensitivity over ‘locality’, ‘uniqueness’, ‘difference’ is another consideration. These cautionary phrases are contemporary cliches, and I wonder if they have the same force as when Derrida and Deleuze were exploring the logic of difference in the 60’s and 70’s. As Baudrillard might say, the fact that everyone speaks of difference so readily implies it’s disappearance. The “heterogeneous materials deployed by different networks of knowledge and existence” are coordinating themselves into an effective global unity, the value of this movement is uncertain.
“Any materialism or naturalism would have to be totally empty of content amounting to just a meaningless ritual formula, or it would have to be judged on its consequences for our knowledge both present and future.”
I’m assuming this means “materialism or naturalism” considered as a unity, or unities (if one distinguishes materialism from naturalism)? If so, “totally empty of content” is reminiscent of Mahayana Buddhism’s Sunyata: “meaningless ritual formula”? Buddhism has rituals, and see Derrida’s “meaning-to-say-nothing” (Positions:14, the whole page): as to judgment and consequences of knowledge: different people, different knowings, different worlds: all aon the ‘same’ globe, at the ‘same’ time (Is time a unity?)?
Regarding ‘idealism’, I don’t really see what’s wrong with it. It’s just an alternative configuration of knowledge, ‘weighted’ differently than ‘materialism’.
“very misleading picture”
If you’re referring to Larval Subjects, I seem to have upset him. He wrote a contentious post, with a contentious title, and there was an opportunity for productive debate, under the rubric he chose. In a good spirit, of course. It didn’t transpire.
I too ceased philosphical activity for about a decade. I remember about ten years ago telling people that I was an “ex-philosopher”. I took up philosophical activity again roughly 2 years ago when I created a blog to discuss issues around Hubert Dreyfus’s and Sean Kelly’s podcast courses and their book ALL THINGS SHINING. They created a blog and I was hoping to take part in a flourishing discussion, but I found the exchanges to a large extent unsatisfying, and they gradually petered out after about a year. This is when I discovered Levi Bryant’s blog and I was initially enthusiastic. He seemed to be reading and discussing all sorts of interesting things. I published a few comments on his blog but I never got any replies, and I began to notice his dogmatic and exclusionary attitude. I became timidly critical initially of Harman and then of Bryant and I realised that I had been quietly banned from his blog. Deciding that I had nothing to lose I chose to express myself exactly as I thought, and abandon all diplomacy. I have given an abundance of arguments against particular positions of OOOxians and neither Harman nor Bryant has deigned to reply, except very indirectly and not mentioning me by name. You at least have been replied to however curtly, and I hope it nourishes your reflexion.
My training is in philosophy of science, and I have always espoused a pluralism of the type that Feyerabend elaborated. I too used to read stuff by Latour 15 years ago, and I thought it was just old-hat watered down epistemology. Although I was in vague agreement with much of what he said I could see nothing new in it. He has progressed a lot since then, and his new stuff on a pluralism of modes of existence is quite congenial to me, but I still don’t see anything very original. So I agree with you that “There is no matter” could easily be regarded as a Derridean slogan. I was very inspired by the interview POLITICS AND FRIENDSHIP where Derrida talks about hios misgivings over Althusserianism and over the naive and uncritical use of notions such as object and objectivity in relation to science and about how Husserl helped him to see more complexity there. So I don’t see any incompatibility between Derrida and naturalism, as long as one is willing to examine the ambiguities in such concepts as nature and science.
Would that OOO attain to the mind-opening ritual formulas of the Prajnaparamita Sutras, but I think that their formulae are mind-closing despite initial appearances.
“I began to notice his dogmatic and exclusionary attitude”
You wanted to debate philosophy.
You were obviously a threat to their main project, which seems to be system-building, and creating a ‘brand’. There’s nothing wrong with that, unless it’s a substitute for thinking.
“I hope it nourishes your reflexion”
Not much ‘nourishment’ to be had, he used the polemical style of my comments as a pretext for evasion of the arguments.
Censorship by the ‘Cult of the Five Senses’
And obviously, as you can see, comment 36 was unable to meet his standard of ‘civility’: because his procedure of ‘moderation’ censored it.
One wonders whether the insularity of this circle of ‘moderation’ characterises the entire project of ‘Object Oriented Ontology’?
The instinct for deception and manipulation that characterises an almost imperial disdain for rational argument.
Do we need such tyranny?
Perhaps there are those who reserve ‘democracy’ only for the domain of ‘objects’ which they can control?
“So I don’t see any incompatibility between Derrida and naturalism, as long as one is willing to examine the ambiguities in such concepts as nature and science.”
‘Nature’ is a word, a concept, that has a history of meanings. ‘Naturalism’, likewise. It is possible to reconfigure these ‘meanings’ in various ways. But it is important to remember that it is not the only word, that entire civilisations have existed outside its remit.
“Would that OOO attain to the mind-opening ritual formulas of the Prajnaparamita Sutras, but I think that their formulae are mind-closing despite initial appearances.”
Perhaps, by practicing a thought of closure, they seek to maintain the illusion of ‘mind’
“It is unnecessary to venture into the realms of conspiracy theory, such has always been the province of monotheistic response, the epistemic obsession to find anthropomorphic determinants which can be demonised as other. An obsession perhaps stemming from the hubristic anthropocentrism that desacralises everything but itself in order to licence its exploit(ation)s. And if its fragmentary epistemic projects, its ‘sciences’, displace earlier principles of monotheistic regimentation, so much the better, the goals, anyway, were always kontrol, power, and deception. And whence this deception? Isn’t it only the methodology necessitated by the first two goals? No, it is the self-deception engineered to obscure the realisation that it has no self, no culture, beyond that of exploitation: ‘I deceive and exploit others, therefore I am.'”
[…] arguments his comments were accused of being “aggressive and condescending” and finally censored. In his analysis of the incident (the whole process, from encounter to censorship, took only 2 […]
Yea, I’ve watched these debates from afar. I too admire aspects of the OOO gang(Graham Harman, Levi R. Bryant, Ian Bogost, Timothy Morton), yet obviously I’m more out of the tradition of Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bataille, Cioran, Deleuze and a multitude of other Continental and Analytical readings. I have watched SR grow from the original four Quentin Meillasoux (mainly a pupil of Badiou and Mathematization of Being), Ray Brassier (Nihil Unbound – who I admire), Iain Hamilton Grant (Idealist and Schellingian whose latest history of Idealism is excellent), and Graham Harman ( who wrote a good work on Bruno Latour and is writing one on Latour’s politics among other worthy works on Lovecraft etc.).
I try my best to stay out of the flame wars that seem to crop up from time to time. I don’t see the need to take sides on these issues in blog posts as far as personal aspects. Not to defend Levi in anyway, I have seen him under siege from many factions for a number of years. So I can understand if he is edgy and takes offense easily. Not that I condone out and out censorship, which goes against my Marxist grain…
Dang, I wish people could just enter into productive debates without all the actual bashing of someone’s person. I think this is what bothers me on both sides of the issues involved. I know that you have just returned to philosophy and blogging. I’ll add you to my site and keep tabs, looks like you have interesting toughts. Keep you chin up, it’s a tough blog community, but there are some great individuals participating in it as well. Good luck to you and persevere! I chug along and do it because I enjoy it whether people agree of disagree and try to keep an old style Socratic amiabilty towards friends and enemies alike. I’ve always felt that you can learn from those that oppose you. They make you truly think through your own conceptual arguments and frameworks. Otherwise how would be grow?
Anyway welcome to blogging in the philosophical blogosphere!
Thank you for your warm welcome, I appreciate it.
Regarding OOO, I haven’t really read their works yet, so can’t offer a comprehensive critique, really. It wouldn’t be fair. I have an impression of what they’re doing, and it’s good that they’re doing it. Timothy Morton is very good. He doesn’t seem to indulge in hype,and he’s interesting. I haven’t checked out Ian Bogost yet.
“I have seen him under siege from many factions for a number of years. So I can understand if he is edgy and takes offense easily.”
I think that’s probably an accurate characterisation, but it’s a charitable one that takes his context into account. If he neglects to apply such charitability to the historical figures he ‘railroads’ into his revisionist narratives, is it not permissable to hypothesize about his textual response, omission, and OOO, with the same neglect? lol
“I’ve always felt that you can learn from those that oppose you. They make you truly think through your own conceptual arguments and frameworks. Otherwise how would be grow?”
‘Opposition’ teaches the knowledge of antithetical progression. This is a game of ‘arguments’ that can provoke new insights, perhaps bringing greater awareness of presupposed ‘frameworks’. Through such processes, do ‘we‘ grow? Your typo turns ‘we‘ into ‘be‘, into ‘being‘? Is ‘we‘, the ‘us‘, ‘being‘? Is this ‘being‘ a ‘social‘ concept?
Coincidentally, I actually went to your blog, Noir Realism, recently, prior to your commenting here, and got these two posts, ‘Nick Land: Quote of the Day!’, and ‘Questioning Meillassoux’, for my Zotero library.
I think that the problem with affective reactions is not so much their static characterisation but their orientation. If someone is “edgy and takes offense easily” this can lead to a reaction of closure (eg. “Thus, I dismiss you, with a simple phrase” or worse, “Thus, I do banish you from the discussion”) or to an active opening (“What do you have to say about this objection? or even “I have clarified my formulations to get around your objection, we still disagree, but now I am stronger thanks to you” – yes it can happen!). So edginess and touchiness are compatible with openness too. The sad affects are “sad” not because of any intrinsic quality but because of these sorts of directionalit. Strangely, depression is not necessarily a sad affect, and I would argue that depression is a constant presence in the work of Deleuze and Feyerabend, my 2 favorite examples of a philosophy of affirmation. So I think the key factor is the question “Is something happening between me and the touchy person that that inceases my power and so adds to my being?” (supposing that it is the other person that is “touchy” and not me, of course we both could be).
We don’t know that Levi Bryant reacted in an affective way. In any case, whether someone is “edgy and takes offense easily” need not have any bearing on the ‘truth’ value of their claims. And as you say, an affect does not have to constrain subsequent responses to only one path. If it seems that ‘closure’ was chosen, there could be any number of reasons why that was so. It’s not important, though, it’s the regressive movement, as a whole, that is perhaps of concern. A movement that has always been of concern, a movement that began, perhaps, with Aristotle.
Closure is not bad in itself, we all need some dose of closure to avoid dissolving into sludge or evaporating into mist. Regression too can be a prelude to a higher integration. In these matters, as Feyerabend says, “anything goes”. I once glossed this as “anything could make us progress, but most won’t”. Choosing closure as a heuristic move in a particular context is far better than being-closed. “Anything goes” also contains “go” a simple enough word for movement. So another gloss could be “anything could make the movement happen, we don’t know in advance how and when the movement of individuation, the progressive movement, can be produced”. That is one form of openness, not knowing in advance, but being on the alert.
“Closure is not bad in itself, we all need some dose of closure to avoid dissolving into sludge or evaporating into mist.”
It is possible to view all life on the globe as a kind of biospheric sludge: take all biological processes and speed them up in a ‘thought experiment’. Straight away, another scenario emerges, conventional nodes of emphasis recede, ones of relatively longer duration come into play. And these processes are ‘real’ or ‘material’, by any criterion.
Apparently, Marx’s formulation, “All that is solid melts into air (Alles Ständische und Stehende verdampft)” can be translated as “everything standing turns into steam”.
Given these two perspectives, and whatever statistical constraints they exercise, is it possible to speak of ‘closure’ in any sense beyond the limited sphere of ‘human autonomy’ and its cult of ‘decisionality’? The more so, when this sphere is deliberately ‘regressive’, as in the laughable restatements of traditional topoi that are attempting to pass themselves off as ‘philosophy’, SR and OOO. As this seems to have been achieved, it gives a licence to place the entire Occidental tradition in question. As history shows, that tradition could be said to be innately coercive, premissed on war as it is:
“War is father of all, king of all. Some it makes gods, some it makes men, some it makes slaves, some free.”
“We must realize that war is universal, and strife is justice, and that all things come into being and pass away through strife.”
Heraclitus “Fragments”
Is it so surprising that Heraclitus was misanthropic?
Thankfully, there are other traditions.
[…] “This is disturbing, it is redolent of other book burning practioners rather than David Hume. Hume’s scepticism emerged out of a genuine philosophic path, rather than the unthinking ‘cult-speaks’ that characterise the epoch of an exploitative ‘modernity’, of which ‘speculative realism’ seems to be the most recent, sub-cultural ‘gang’ argot. A collation of anachronies and out-of-context citations, ‘speculative realism’ attempts to contrive imaginary philosophical contentions by replaying ‘positions’ no one has seriously held for centuries.” (“Fighting Things You Cannot See: A Quick Response” – http://visionfiction.theotechne.com/WordPress/?p=154) ~~~~~~~~~~~ […]