the Quantum: a Clear Convention, or a Vague ‘Reality’?
Discussion with Terence Blake, here.
{AK}: The specification that creates an ‘immanence’, ineluctably creates ‘transcendence’.
Contesting a history of privilegings, whether of the ‘immanent’, or ‘transcendent’, even Plato’s own, does nothing to address the initial specification.
Shifting initial specifications, so that they are more in accord with current, received intuitions, of whatever constitutes the ‘given reality’ of an age, merely shifts the microscope’s field of vision from one area of the heavens, to another. It doesn’t relinquish the microscope for a telescope.
In a way, any language at all, necessarily exemplifies a monistic flavour; the identity of a language, as a language, suggests that. So ‘monism’ can’t really be escaped, it’s a necessary corollary of ‘plurality’. If you combine languages, like George Steiner, the combination, if it becomes standardised, could be characterised as monistic. Hybridity begets new forms of unity, as it were.
Apophatic caution ensures that one doesn’t get fixated by any horizon, by a single star.
Mathematical reductionism
Mathematics is just a language essentially contingent on the ‘metric’.
The ‘metric’ is the ‘measured’; the ‘measured’ is a specification, as system, that produces further sub-specifications within its field.
I don’t really see that Mathematics is essentially different to any other semiotic system.
It’s natural that subcultural uses of language proliferate.
If “mathematics is ontology” is suspect, why wouldn’t ‘ontology is ontology’ be suspect, too?
One has to ask “what is mathematics?”, “what does it specify?”, & is this any different to the ontological?
If ‘measurement’ is specification; if specification is identification; if identification is entity production; if this entitification, as it were, is ontologisation; then, mathematics is just another branch of ontological specification.
In fact, one could see all languages that use any categorical specification at all, as branches of mathematics.
All of this stuff is transitive, interchangeable, conventional.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
[Terence Blake]: “Laruelle’s own solution is to make a “weak”, allegorical, use of quantum physics as a style of thinking, but his explanations are scientifically vague, incomplete, and one-sided as well as philosophically obscure, due to his use of his typically inadequately defined but quite abstract vocabulary.”
{AK}: Terence, if you rule out both “Mathematical reductionism”, & if the holistic metaphors of “Eastern traditions” are ruled out “as philosophically obscure” or vague, what else is left to avoid the “scientifically vague”?
Remember, quantum physicists, themselves, don’t really have any clear theoretical interpretations, they just do the mathematics.
The Tests & Observations of History
A response to Jonah Dempcy – (Deleuze): “It was Nietzsche who said that nothing is ever free from a ‘nonhistorical cloud.’
“experiment (n.)
mid-14c., “action of observing or testing; an observation, test, or trial;” also “piece of evidence or empirical proof; feat of magic or sorcery,” from Old French esperment “practical knowledge, cunning; enchantment, magic spell; trial, proof, example; lesson, sign, indication,” from Latin experimentum “a trial, test, proof, experiment,” noun of action from experiri “to test, try” (see experience (n.))
experiment (v.)
late 15c., from experiment (n.). Intransitive sense by 1787. Related: Experimented; experimenting.”
Experiment – Online Etymology Dictionary
To inhabit the event, or to subject that eventuality to sequential knowledge, to commemorate it in some form of historical reflection?
Is this choice not contingent on a secret complicity?
What is an ‘event’ as an ‘event’?
What is this multiplexed object with “all its components or singularities”?
How does it arise, how is it conceived?
If “history amounts” to “only the set of preconditions” for this ‘event’, then it is assumed the ‘event’ is historically conditioned, a historical ‘effect’.
But, regarding the ‘event’, is not “going through all its components or singularities”, not itself the construction of another ‘history’, even if a personal & experiential one, inscribed on the ‘body’, a lived chronicle, unrecouped by the formalisations of grouped memory?
‘History’ is not possible without ‘events’ to sequence & recount.
The very essence of the eventual presupposes the sequential & the transitional.
If “Becoming isn’t part of history”; if incommensurable with that history; from where else does it derive the character of being ‘new’?
From the ‘experiencer’, whose ‘bodily history’ ‘feels’ the novelty?
In such a scenario, then, is it the case, that the character of ‘innovation’ occurs through a ‘recognition’, in which the ‘experiencer’ engaged in “Becoming”, is itself the emissary & receptacle of the ‘History’ that it allegedly has left behind.
“You can take so&so out of the ghetto, but you can’t take the ghetto out of so&so.”
‘History’ is already a Becoming; & every Becoming is a history.
What drives this desire for such conceptually staged ‘novelty’?
-An oppressive ‘History’, itself constructed?
-A need for Messianic regeneration from the horrors of Modernity?
-Exhaustion, horror, or guilt, over exploitation?
-A barbaric boredom with the complexities of life?
-Is this desire for a pure inhabitation of “components or singularities”, a modularised fascism; the nostalgic desire for the clean existential lines of an ahistoric neo-Modernist rupture; the inability of all these dogmatic desires to think through more complex bio-geometries?
And, if it is claimed that “History isn’t experimental”, what does Benjamin’s “Angelus Novus” gaze on, if not the carnage of experiment? ‘History’ is just the writeup of ‘Results’ & ‘Conclusions’ in an ongoing ‘Scientific Method’ or “Wissenschaft”.
In the languages purporting the Absolute, though, has there ever, really, been an ‘event’?
ARE Ontological Fictions, fRictions?
In response to Terence Blake’s citing of “Philo-fiction”, here.
Terence, I wrote a little comment on this “Philo-fiction” word. But, due to technical issues (HD issues, wasn’t backed up), it’s not accessible.
The gist of the comment is etymological.
Philosophy, is philo, love; & sophos, wisdom.
Thus, “Philo-fiction” would be Love-Fiction, or Love-Making (fictiō – fashioning, forming, formation; fiction)
Instantly predictable, the knee-jerk responses of the plodding habitués of institutionalised academia; reluctant to abandon the unthinking easy innovations characteristic of those with no linguistic flair, habituated to a mindset of marketing banality; would declare that there is no greater ‘wisdom’ than ‘love’, instantly tapping into common sentiment.
But this base level, metonymy of ‘wisdom’, & alliteration of ‘Philosophy’, is blatantly for the ‘coffee table’ set who wish to be seen as thinking; even “filofax” was a better, more apt, nom de nouvelle, as it were.
‘Sophiction’, at least would be etymologically accurate.
‘Sophiaction’ – Wisdom in action?
a ‘phiact’, is better than a fact!
A fiat, lol.
A Divine Avenue (1988) – AUTHOR’S INTRODUCTION
A deliberately mannered introduction.
AUTHOR’S INTRODUCTION
If some readers regard this bag of fictions to be nothing more than a sack of speeches blended with conceptual com, or a hold-all of harangues mixed with metaphysical trinkets, they would not be suffering from misconceptions, for this book is all of those things. But it is also a heap of hints, or, to extend the above metaphor, a carrier of allusions and implicatives; seen in this light, it should, I hope, provide more than a modicum of inspiration for the reader. If it manages to make such provision, I will consider it a success.
No doubt this book suffers from many defects, much as I would like to claim that it is flawless, such a claim would veer away from the realms of veracity. Nevertheless, I shall continue to hope that its readers derive something from it, I’m not sure what exactly, but something which enhances Life in an enchanting manner, and also attempts to bring Existence and Intelligence together.
However, that slippery character Life, whose allonym is Existence, remains highly refractory when any attempts are made to bring it into an ultimately intimate correspondence with human understanding. It is an elusive thing; evading epistemology with eel-like undulations.
Perhaps that is its nature. Perhaps Life is inherently problematic; an obscure phenomenon that teasiingly reveals to our thoughts only riddles, dilemmas, and paradoxes. Some say it is these very clashes of contradictories and the tensions between them, that constitute Existence. If such a notion is accepted, then paradox may be regarded as the fuel of Life. Be that as it may, for my own part, I suspect that Life will prove intransigent even when asked to conform to its own inconsistencies.
Whether or not paradox is the fuel of Life is contestable, but it is certain that paradox is the fuel of LIFE! “What is this LIFE ?” you ask. Because I’m kind, I’ll tell you. LIFE is acronymous for the Literature of Infinite Fictions Engine. Stokcd with paradox, this engine will transport you across the spaces of fiction. So reader, ride this engine, this mechanism of language, this train of’ letters and words, ride it to wherever uou want to go. LIFE, like Life, goes everywhere.
Gcd bless this contrivance cf communications and all its readers.
Off we go!
A Divine Avenue (1988) – AUTHOR’S COMMENTS
Actual quote, & fictive quotes.
AUTHOR’S COMMENTS
I’ll use this page as a device to insert some quotes. I have included the Sextus Empiricus quotation as it voices my own personal views on certain matters.
“I have a thousand tongues and a tongue, but only one mouth to put them in.”
Abu Jabbar
“I Know ‘Athene’s Avenue’ wouId’ve sounded better, but I decided to avoid the excruciatingly obvious.
Author of A ‘Divine Avenue’
“We do not positively affirm that the fact is as we state it, but simply record each fact like a chronicler. as it appears to us at the moment.”
Sextus Empiricus (I think)
“When we were doing the rounds with our “Snow White And The Seven Dwarves” show, we did a gig in the collective consciousness of the Milky Way galaxy, but we didn’t go down too well. Some dumpy planet near the rim – I think it was called Earth or Dirt or Dearth or something – anyway, this Dirty Earth planet was the only place that liked us. Especially the children, their minds were all over us.”
“So yeah, Life has its good points.”
Mizz Snow White
A Divine Avenue (1988) – CONTENTS
Architectonic – sections & chapters
Here are the sections & chapters of the novella.
CONTENTS
Title Page…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 0
Contents………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1
Author’s Comments…………………………………………………………………………..…. 2
Author’s Introduction………………………………………………………………………..…. 3
Prologue “The Abstraction”………………………………………………………………….. 4
1/ “4040 Saint Sophia Avenue”………………………………………………………….….. 6
2/ “The Universe At The Edge Of Creation”……………………………………………. 19
3/ “A Procession Of Processes”………………………………………………………….…. 27
4/ “Temporal Investiture”……………………………………………………………………. 33
5/ “Cranthimus Jaxley, Temporal Technician At Your Service”……………….. 42
6/ “Constructing Reality”………………………………………………………………….…. 48
7/ “Richard Merriman’s Elusive Merchant”…………………………………………… 51
8/ “The Pursuit Of Unhappiness”…………………………………………………………. 63
9/ “Logovia And Graphico”………………………………………………………………….. 65
10/ “At The Thought Port”…………………………………………………………………….. 71
11/ “Fountain Of Creation”………………………………………………………………….… 81
12/ “The Divine Cinema”…………………………………………………………………….… 83
Epilogue “The Various Voices Of Jabbar”……………………………………………. 84
Author’s Afterword………………………………………………………………………….… 88
A Divine Avenue (1988) – Title Page
I wrote a novella, “A Divine Avenue” (1988), more than 28 years ago.
It inaugurated a fictional consideration of ideas whose implicit modes & perspectives have yet to be explicitly & formally codified, if indeed such is even possible. Though I moved into other concerns, surveying various theoretical genres in Philosophy, ‘Literary Theory’, Anthropology; just about everything really, that was around; the sense of their contingent localisation, within a far greater space of possibilities, was never lost. Continuing explorations within this space, led to two more tentative ‘works’. All three works form a kind of synergy. “A Divine Avenue” is the first work in that tentative trilogy.
Title Page
This is the title page.
In showing “A Divine Avenue” on the internet, I’ve inserted “Artxell Knaphni” as the author. You can tell by its ‘lack of fade’, as it were, in the images below. As “Artxell Knaphni” is a character in the novella, the novella being the origin of my uses of the name; on my blog, “Visions of Temporal Accumulation”; on FaceBook & elsewhere; there is a kind of circle of nominality, scribed over the years.
A DIVINE AVENUE
A Mildly Metaphysical Phantasy
By Artxell Knaphni
Some Light-Hearted Lectures Of Liberation,
Possibly Leading To A Farrago Of Freedoms. Just Add
Butter, Eggs, And A Generous Pinch Of Salt.
AN ABRIDGED VERSION
OF AN UNWRITTEN
NOVEL
The Thoughtscape of Levelled Promotions
This is a response to John Ó Maoilearca’s “Thinking In Equality: On Laruelle’s Democracy Of Thought”, here.
[John Ó Maoilearca]: “Individually, they are all One – and this is firstly a performative gesture before it becomes an ontological thesis (that tells us ‘what they are’)”:
{AK}: If this “One” is “firstly” a somatic sign, is such deliverance into an ecstasy of accomplishings, not a flight into an ‘action mysticism’?
There are two possible subtextual registers operating here: one, is the anchoring in a kind of Wittgensteinian “showing” that sidesteps interpretative drift; two, is the implicit valorisation of an unquestioned expediency, in the appeal to ‘practical action’ as an unquestioned ‘given’.
The dancing ‘body’ is, in-deed, important, but it is precisely because of that import that it risks returning to whatever insidious & coercive dualisations are floating around: the remnants of Cartesian afterglow.
[John Ó Maoilearca]: “Individuals invent equality, they do not possess it (as a philosophical property of difference, multiplicity, and so on).”
{AK}: The very notion of the “individual”, too, is a categorisation complicit with the machineries of identification, as are the “philosophical properties] of difference, multiplicity” etc..
If overly restrictive definitions were not turned into dogmas in the first place, there would be no requirement to needlessly multiply distinctions. It was the demand for an abbreviated & telegraphic linguistics of efficiency, stemming from a culture of expediency, that created those fragmentary understandings of dogmatism.
[John Ó Maoilearca]: Alternatively, if there were no third quality or type, then their equality is not defined but invented: in other words, it is performative (a concept I discuss in the final chapter of my book).
{AK}: Equality is a relation. In order for its operation to function, the relata to be equalised require a ‘level’ at which equivalence can obtain. So ‘equality’ is always a relational construction, one that calls on metrical thinking, evaluation, similitude, etc.. But note, the relata have to be specified as perceivably distinct ‘identities’ first, even if the work of definition is held in abeyance. It is this very identification; this production by the machineries of identification; which is the first ‘levelling’, the initial entry into the democracy of entities.
The selection of further ‘levels’ of equivalence (your “third quality or type”) are a function of the remaining combinatorial possibilities available to those specified entities. Further ‘levels’, moreover, usually draw on logics of similitude & analogy. The elaboration of such logics can, of course, reinscribe & transform the initial characterisations of the specified entities, or ‘identities’, or relata.
[John Ó Maoilearca]: “And yet – haven’t I earlier said that film and philosophy both think, that they are equally thoughtful? Isn’t that a third quality? Well, yes and no. The reason I say ‘no’ is because I haven’t defined what thought or thinking is.”
{AK}: Is there a need to define “thought or thinking”?
Or its usual corollary, the concept of ‘Self’?
Oscillating between a pantheistic solipsism of all encompassing ‘Self’ & an extreme eliminativism that can no longer find any determinate thing or ‘self’ to eliminate. But notice, an all encompassing ‘Self’ with no negation, has no determination, either. Such lack of determination effectively equates with a lack of a determinate thing or ‘self’: solipsism equates with eliminativism. In pantheistic solipsism, all determinations are consumed by a movement of rampant synthesis around the notion of ‘Self’: in eliminativism, the notion of ‘Self’ can no longer be located or identified in an absolute or final way with regard to determinations in general. The very determinations that define, are exceeded in both cases, by an absolutist drive.
Mutatis mutandis, the same overall logic applies to any determinate conception of “thought or thinking”.
[John Ó Maoilearca]: “I have simply said that film and philosophy equally think, but in their own way. This is a pluralistic gesture to be sure, but, according to Laruelle at least, it is also a non-philosophical gesture, because the job of philosophy (by contrast) is to attempt to enforce one or other image alone of what counts as thought.”
{AK}: I’m not so sure this is true.
That there are institutional preoccupations which follow trends, is not so controversial. But are such institutional trends the whole of Philosophy? Do they even pretend to be? If one looks at Philosophy, philosophia, as a strictly Occidental formation; following strict lines of demarcation & exclusion; as a history of self-identified institutions; Laruelle could have a point. But I’m not so sure, even there, that such lines could be so neatly drawn.
Could Laruelle be conflating such institutional ambitions of self-identification with actual philosophical practices & work(s)?
I’m not saying that there aren’t monolithic tendencies in the tradition, but they don’t exhaust it. Even your chosen expression, “enforce one or other image”, suggests plural contention between ‘images’.
[John Ó Maoilearca]: “Despite what appears to many as philosophy’s benign, abstract, and consequently (perhaps) even irrelevant status, Laruelle takes philosophy to be the supreme form of thought control, or, to be clear, a device for controlling what counts as proper or fundamental thought.”
{AK}: Again, this seems to indicate negative experiences of institutional contexts, rather than the works themselves. I’m not saying it’s wrong. But noone is forcing Laruelle to go along with the control, if he claims to be able to discern it.
[John Ó Maoilearca]: “All thoughts can be equal, but what that equality consists in has to be invented each and every time in an ongoing process of equalizing.”
{AK}: An “ongoing process of” relating, in which all the relata are ‘equally’ relata, available for consideration. What such considerational ‘use’ or ‘performance’ might consist in, is open to question & interpretation, & even, for those so inclined, open to that com-forting rhetoric of ‘agency’, with its ‘choices’ & ‘decisions’. But a conventional metaphysics of ‘agency’ is not necessarily the only game in town.
PAN-cognitive equivalence & flat CAKE theory
[John Ó Maoilearca]:”After 5 years work, All Thoughts Are Equal is finally out. There’s a link to a 20% flyer below. Coffee and biscuits not included.” (here)
{AK}: “All Thoughts Are Equal” & “Coffee and biscuits not included”?
Although assertions of pan-cognitive equivalence do not directly contradict considerations of inclusivity with respect to the work on offer, the exclusion of such baked confections is worrying. The unilateral banning of a beverage, too, without explanation, is no less bereft of such anxiety.
Aside from the uncertain particularity of the ‘biscuit’ subset, regarding the general category of baked confections – Jaffa Cakes? – a more pressing consideration presents itself.
It is asserted that the unity of a textual work (“5 years work”), concerning an all-inclusive cognitive democracy, has been finalised (“is finally out”). Yet a subset of baked confections & a beverage appear only as negations, moreover, as negations mentioned ‘outside’ the allegedly ‘finalised work’. Whether or not they are cited within the hallowed confines of Ó Maoilearca’s pan-cognitive opus is uncertain. But, if such is not the case, are we confronted with the author’s mockery of his own work & claims? This is difficult to determine.
Ostensibly, the work could be seen as an integrated demonstration of the titular thesis, the externally mentioned negations as orbital confirmations of that thesis: “All Thoughts”, wherever they are, “Are Equal”, ‘textual work’ (“book”) boundaries notwithstanding.
Or, by couching the work in a hypothetical ‘transaction’, where the exclusion of biscuit & beverage purchases a reduction in cost of the “book” (the work-as-commodity; “a link to a 20% flyer”), has Ó Maoilearca secretly written a work of political economy?
More disturbingly, perhaps: does the author’s finalisation of his work index a departure from cognitive democracy itself? Was pan-cognitive egalitarianism a five year task that is “is finally out” & finished with? Is Ó Maoilearca free to return to hierarchical concerns?
Or, there is always the possibility that the author’s overt exclusion of the baked confection & beverage industries masks a covert collusion with them. The lack of brand specification in “Coffee and biscuits” suggests the complicity of general, industry-wide marketing boards, experimenting with the instruments of generality characteristic of Philosophy.
Whatever the details, it is obvious that the work itself, the “book”, is merely a pretext for its author. At the risk of initiating a new orthodoxy of interpretation concerning Ó Maoilearca’s work, it seems “incontournable” that everything hinges on the “Coffee and biscuits”!
The author’s real achievement, of which he was entirely unaware during its performance, is that of writing a work that has nothing to do with Francois Laruelle, whilst copiously citing that very thinker throughout the work! Only by giving himself over, entirely, to a Laruellean pretextual consciousness, was Ó Maoilearca able to generate, as a quantum effect of ‘critical emanation’ (cf. ‘Catastrophe Theoretics’), the random manifestation of baked confection (bcp) & beverage (bvp) particularities, in such a definite configuration (C(bcp-bvp)).
Consumed by the localised labour of the Laruellean thesis, even the possibility of non-local ‘critical emanation’ of C(bcp-bvp) was necessarily obscured to Ó Maoilearca. Nevertheless, as soon as that labour was complete, the inexorable law of non-local ‘critical emanation’ exercised its power through Ó Maoilearca himself, using him as its instrument of production.
No doubt, the author’s protestations are to be expected; & can be attributed to the proportional persistence of Laruellean pretextual consciousness; spellbound by his earlier labours, as Ó Maoilearca must be.
It is difficult not to fall into the position of Russell surveying Frege’s work on the foundations of arithmetic, or Bohr critiquing Einstein’s “hidden variables”, but, of course, this review is of far greater import. Those earlier encounters merely concerned local disciplinary concerns. This evaluation, like the work it examines, concerns everything, all that is thought.
Of the three scenarios of scrutiny, this review, definitely, & non-locally, “takes the biscuit”, even though only non-biscuits were offered.
[Tags: Area 51, Extraterrestrial Confection Conspiracy, Hollow Earth Semiotics & Jammie Dodgers as Transcendental Edible]
Aeolian Inquiry: Quest(ion)s of the Whirlwind
Is it the case, in the face of ‘human’ cultural production, that one can only settle into a comfortable anthropology of ironic hypocrisy? A settling as submission at a distance?
As the way is cleared, of the same tired doxa and identity wars, is it possible to think again. Or has this doxa been inflated, so that all we hear is the clamour of ‘believing spirits’, their well-rehearsed and circumscribed clashes, the litany of disngenuities constituting their manufactured ‘history’?
These questions describe the formations by which a general consensuality tends to function, the tacit standards of reductive appropriation exemplified in its actual effects. With such questions, no more is necessary than simple statement. To attempt any answer amenable to general understanding, only leads to tacit reduction.
Is it the case, that such anthropic doxa constitutes a centralised control system from which deliverance is required? Are we dealing with a Hegelian “Borg” cube? Or is this yet another self-image, which such a ‘cube’ feeds itself, which the Social feeds itself, as a ‘holding pattern’, to obscure its own disingenuous hypocrisies?
It seems that it is precisely such conceptual fixations, and perhaps the desire to amplify these fixations through simulations of populist communication, that constitute the modulations of tacit reduction forming the mode of ‘control’ itself.
Nevertheless, it is not my contention that any process is somehow, simply and essentially, a fixation in itself. Notions of ‘fixation’, too, are contingent on contextual determination.
However, through the tracing of such contextual determinants; their topographic distributions as seen from this or that conceptual plane; the various modalities of their operation; a larger and more precise sense of what is at play can be developed. If it is argued that the language of ‘precision’ is merely one set of images disciplined, or ‘filtered’, by another: I do not deny this, but rather, investigate why this is so. If a similar objection is offered concerning ‘magnitude of theoretical comprehension’, this, too, is easily susceptible to further inquiry.
The enshrining of expediency as the driver for innovation has become a cliche.
Neither the production of surface technical novelty, nor its deep consideration, have been lacking; but the productions have often been fragmentary and disconnected; their mutual relevance, endlessly deferred and displaced into further differential commentaries; the generation of valuable insights, if it occurs at all, never leaves the academy; actual implementation is always obstructed by representations of vested interest, of sociopolitical power, sometimes within the academy itself, which acts as a holding reservoir of futures, deployable only according to the interests of those ‘vested interests’. As all of this can be said to fall under the rubric of an ‘anthropology of ironic hypocrisy’, it cannot serve as a primary reference, though its consideration is not to be entirely neglected.
More often than not, the procedures of innovation are governed by an ambient and global Taylorism that dominates all social activity these days. Even meditative and contemplative states are measured, their effects on performance catalogued and commodified. Every aspect of ‘existence’ is converted into the standardisations of a general information phenomenology, therewith to construct; ‘Being’; ‘Existence’; as the ultimate shopping catalogues.
“Necessity”, they say, “is the mother of invention”, but is it the mother of fresh understandings beyond the novel technical object, and its secret demands on thought? Or does only an empty and contextless rush of expediency prevail, its animating logics forgotten, in a ‘stampediency’ driven by dreams of unlimited convenience?
The easy and unquestioned transactions of ‘Necessity’ have often been the pretext for countless structures of social and political coercion, all of which have their alibi in various images of ‘Necessity’. ‘Vested interests’ use the opportunistic proximities of power to enable disingenuous constructions of administrative necessity favouring only themselves. The desire to secure such convenient forms of distribution, as it were, exercises considerable ideological constraint on the general culture, on its interpretations, practices and world-views. Management of reaction to these constraints is easily achieved through tactical delimitation, around intuitive, issue-based polarities.
Beyond this economic code of competing conveniences, that tries to be all things to all (its?) consuming souls, resides an ignored possibility, a space no longer governed by this code and its conventions, beyond its siren call to harbours of a treacherous Necessity.
All along, stronger winds have always blown, within and without. With regard to these forces, the comforting theatricks of Necessity can no longer track any course beyond its habitual play of self-deceptions. There is no shelter in the incessant and cathartic replay of its mutual corruptions.
The train of transformations was never singular, only administered mythologies ever conveyed their unity, usually under an anthropic rubric, with which all were trained to identify. But the desperate hubris of such a universal was only ever a Modernist hysteria, the inflationary ecstasy of an imagined technological control belonging to the specific singularity of ‘Man’, itself a hysterical and dogmatic conception.
But such a figure can no longer contain the very forces of transformation it sought so effectively to exploit; thus, the ‘future’ brings forth new equilibria, their sequence of emergence, a function of emanative possibility, rather than anthropic history. With such emergences, even their ‘novelty’ stands revealed as an artifact of anthropic understanding. It is precisely this misnamed ‘understanding’, preoccupied exclusively with the theatricks of its own necessities, that, beyond the singularity of its self-elected fixations, has always perceived only whirlwinds, rather than wisdom.
Escaping this theatricks of Necessity and its increasing formations of insular ignorance, its fascinations of local turbulence, is a Fugal Drama; a ‘Theatre of F(light)’; in which the ‘Minstrel of the Improvisations, that Mistral of Ceaseless Inquisitions’, follows an aleatoric strategy of ‘Aeolian Inquiry’.